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CONSENSUS

IN THEOLOGY?

A Dialogue

with Hans Küng and Edward Schillebeeckx

HANS KÜNG, EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX,

and

David Tracy, Avery Dulles, Gerard Sloyan, Leonard Swidler,

Rosemary Radford Ruether, Bernard Cooke, Arthur B. Crabtree,

George Lindbeck, David Willis, Paul M. van Buren,

Nikos A. Nissiotis, Jacob B. Agus, Seyyed Hossein Nasr,

Kana Mitra, John Nijenhuis, Werner H. Kelber, Karl-Josef Kuschel

Edited by

LEONARD SWIDLER

THE WESTMINSTER PRESS

Philadelphia

Originally published as Journal of Ecumenical Studies 17, No. 1 (Winter 1980)

The present volume his been revised and enlarged to include from earlier issues of Journal of Ecumenical Studies reviews by Werner H. Kelber (Summer 1977), Karl-Josef Kuschel (Spring 1979), and Leonard Swidler (Spring 1979).

All rights reserved-no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review in magazine or newspaper.

First edition

Published by The Westminster Press ®

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Printed in the United States of America

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-65385

CONTENTS

Contributors

Introduction

Dialogue: The Way toward Consensus - Leonard Swidler

iii

Essays in Affirmation

Toward a New Consensus in Catholic

(and Ecumenical) Theology - Hans Küng

I Believe in Jesus of Nazareth: The Christ,

the Son of God, the Lord - Edward Schillebeeckx

Essays in Response

Roman Catholic

Particular Questions within General Consensus - David Tracy

Ecumenism and Theological Method - Avery Dulles

Jesus of Nazareth: Today’s Way to God - Gerard Sloyan

History, Sociology and Dialogue: Elements in Contemporary

Theological Method - Leonard Swidler

Is a New Christian Consensus Possible? - Rosemary Radford Ruether

The Experiential “Word of God” - Bernard Cooke

Protestant - Episcopal - Orthodox

Methodological Consensus? A Protestant Perspective

- Arthur B. Crabtree

The Bible as Realistic Narrative - George Lindbeck

Catholic-Ecumenical Theological Consensus?

A Reformed Perspective - David Willis

Historical Thinking and Dogmatics - Paul M. van Buren

An Orthodox Contribution to Consensus - Nikos A. Nissiotis

Jewish - Muslim - Hindu

Six Jewish Thoughts - Jacob B. Agus

A Muslim Reflection on Religion and Theology - Seyyed Hossein Nasr

A Hindu Self-Reflection - Kana Mitra

102

Schillebeeckx’s and Küng’s Recent Works

Christology without Jesus of Nazareth Is Ideology:

A Monumental Work by Schillebeeckx on Jesus - John Nijenhuis

105

ON BEING A CHRISTIAN - Reviewed by Werner H. Kelber

120

DOES GOD EXIST? - Reviewed by Leonard Swidler

122

EXISTIERT GOTT? - Reviewed by Karl-Josef Kuschel

130

Final Statement

Why I Remain a Catholic - Hans Küng

136

CONTRIBUTORS

Jacob B. Agus (Jewish) was born in Poland, was ordained a rabbi from the Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, and studied at Harvard University, where he received a Ph.D. in history and philosophy of religion. He has taught at Temple University, the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, and at present teaches at Dropsie University. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Bernard Cooke (Roman Catholic) studied at St. Louis University, St. Mary’s College, from which he received a licentiate in theology, and the Institut Catholique in Paris, where he received a doctorate in theology. He has taught at Marquette University, the University of Windsor, University of Santa Clara, and at present is Professor of Religion at the University of Calgary. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Arthur B. Crabtree (American Baptist) was born in England, studied at the University of Manchester and the University of Zurich, from which he received a Dr. Theol. He is Professor of Religious Studies at Villanova University and is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Avery Dulles (Roman Catholic) became a Jesuit, was ordained a priest, and studied at Harvard University, Woodstock College, and the Gregorian University in Rome, from which he received an S.T.D. He is a past president of the Catholic Theological Society of America and is Professor of Theology at the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC.

Werner H. Kelber (Lutheran) was born in Germany, studied theology at the Universities of Munich, Tübingen, Erlangen, Princeton, and Chicago, where he received a Ph.D. in New Testament studies. He is on the faculty of Rice University, Houston.

Karl-Joseph Kuschel (Roman Catholic) was born in Germany, studied at the University of Tübingen, from which he received a doctorate in Catholic Theology. He is Research Fellow at the Institute for Ecumenical Research of the University of Tübingen.

Hans Küng (Roman Catholic) was born in Switzerland, ordained a diocesan priest, and studied at the Gregorian University in Rome, from which he received a licentiate in theology, and the Institut Catholique and the Sorbonne in Paris, from which he received a doctorate in theology. He is Professor of Dogmatic and Ecumenical Theology and Director of the Institute of Ecumenical Research of the University of Tübingen and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

George Lindbeck (Lutheran) studied at Gustavus Adolphus College and Yale University, from which he received a Ph.D. He was an official observer at the Second Vatican Council and is Professor of Theology at the Yale Divinity School. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Kana Mitra (Hindu) was born in Dacca, India, studied philosophy at the University of Calcutta, receiving a B.A. (Honors) and M.A. She received the Ph.D. in Religion from Temple University with a dissertation on the bridge-building thought between Christianity and Hinduism by Raimundo Panikkar. She is on the faculty of LaSalle College, Philadelphia.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Muslim) was born in Iran, received a B.A. (with honors) in physics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an M.A. and Ph.D. in the Department of the History and Philosophy of Science of Harvard University. He is the former Chancellor of the Aryamehr University, Teheran, and President of the Iranian Academy of Philosophy, and at present is Professor of Islamics at Temple University, Philadelphia.

John Nijenhuis (Roman Catholic) was born in the Netherlands, became a Carmelite, was ordained a priest, and received a Ph.D. from the Angelicum University in Rome. He has taught philosophy and theology in Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Australia, and the U.S.A., and has just accepted a call to teach in Salisbury, Zimbabwe.

Nikos Nissiotis (Greek Orthodox) was born in Greece, studied at the universities of Zurich, Basel, Louvain, where he received a licentiate in Thomistic philosophy, and Athens, where he received a doctorate in theology. He was the Director of the Ecumenical Institute, Bossey, Switzerland, and at present is Professor of Theology at Athens University. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Rosemary Ruether (Roman Catholic) studied at the Graduate School of Claremont where she received a Ph.D. in classical and early Christian history and thought. She has taught at Howard University, Harvard University, and at present teaches at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois.

Edward Schillebeeckx (Roman Catholic) was born in Antwerp, Belgium, became a Dominican, was ordained a priest, and pursued higher theological studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the Collège de France in Paris and Le Saulchoir, where he received his doctorate in theology. Since 1957 he has been Professor of Dogmatics and History of Theology at the University of Nijmegen, Netherlands.

Gerard Sloyan (Roman Catholic) is a diocesan priest; he studied at Seton Han University and the Catholic University of America, where he received the Ph.D. He is the editor of the New Testament of the New American Bible, Professor of Religion at Temple University, and an Associate Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

Leonard Swidler (Roman Catholic) studied at St. Norbert College, Marquette University, and the University of Wisconsin, from which he received a Ph.D. in history and philosophy, and the universities of Munich and Tübingen, from which he received a licentiate in Catholic theology. He is Professor of Catholic Thought and Interreligious Dialogue at Temple University, Philadelphia, and co-founder and Editor of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies.

David Tracy (Roman Catholic) is a diocesan priest, former President of the Catholic Theological Society of America, author of Blessed Rage for Order, and at present is on the faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

Paul M. van Buren (Episcopalian) studied at Harvard College, the Episcopal Theological School, and the University of Basel, where he received a D. Theol. He has taught at the Episcopal Theological Seminary of the Southwest, and at Temple University where he is presently a Professor of Religion.

David Willis (United Presbyterian) is Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, and was the co-chairperson of the 1970-77 dialogue between the Vatican Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.

INTRODUCTION

DIALOGUE: THE WAY TOWARD CONSENSUS

Leonard Swidler

The conception of this book took place in June, 1979, long before the calling of Edward Schillebeeckx to Rome for interrogation and the censure of Hans Küng. Schillebeeckx had been to Tübingen early in 1979 for an extended seminar, in the process of which the fundamental consensus on how to do theology between Küng and Schillebeeckx-as particularly exemplified in their recent “Jesus books”-became dramatically apparent to Küng. Küng then wondered whether the basic theological method employed by Schillebeeckx, himself, and others might provide the basis on which a new consensus on how to do theology could be formed among contemporary Catholic, and perhaps even non-Catholic, theologians. To this end Küng wrote an essay outlining this theological method as he employs it and as he perceived Schillebeeckx to also use it. The plan was then laid to solicit for a special issue of the Journal of Ecumenical Studies major essays responsive to Küng’s by Schillebeeckx and leading Catholic and non-Catholic theologians from North America. Then Küng was in dialogical fashion to write a concluding essay, taking up the major points of the responsive essays.

However, Roman developments in the late Fall of 1979 prevented the complete carrying out of the original plans. As the pressure from Rome on Schillebeeckx mounted his health sagged so badly that he collapsed and was told by his physician that he had to cease all work for an extended period of time lest he bring on a heart attack. Hence, he had to forego the writing of a fresh essay commenting on Küng’s, as planned. However, he fortunately had just completed a new essay on Christology, the focus of the current investigation by the Vatican and also the major exemplification of the theological method employed by him and Küng. Since it was written in French, the language chosen to be used in the December 13-15, 1979, Roman interrogation, it may well have been a kind of preparation for it. That essay was offered by Schillebeeckx as a substitute for the planned responsive essay. Hence it sees here the first light of day.^*

The unexpected Vatican action against Küng on December 18, 1979, unleashed such a fury of turbulence and activity that continues even as this volume goes to press, and promises to continue for a long time to come, that it became impossible for Küng to find the time and calm needed to write the creative final response essay that was planned. Rather than delay this book indefinitely it was tentatively decided to proceed without it. The subject matter and authors involved made the making of this book available even without the planned Küng response as soon as possible extremely pressing.

On January 11, 1980, one more attempt was made by phone to see whether Küng thought it possible to write at least a brief final responding essay. Sadly it was learned that that very day Küng’s health had suffered a serious setback, such that he too was told by his physician that he had to immediately reduce his activity to a minimum to avoid precipitating an even more serious condition. However, Küng had just completed an essay on “Why I Remain a Catholic,” which he offered for publication at the end of this volume. Thus, we have here the latest substantive writings on the controverted subjects by both Küng and Schillebeeckx.

This volume is an example of how theologizing in the Church and the wider world should be carried on-not by juridical decision but by judicious dialogue. There is no prefabricated consensus here on consensus. The reactions to Küng’s proposal and various aspects of his essay range over an extremely large spectrum. But the ideas proposed by Küng are taken seriously. The dialogue is engaged and sustained. When that is done there is solid hope, even expectation, that eventually better, more helpful conceptualizations and formulations will slowly and continually emerge. When the dialogue is not entered into or is broken off there is certitude that thought patterns will freeze, and that the passage of time and the accompanying changes in t he world will quickly lead to a growing distortion, or at least irrelevance, of the Gospel, the Good News. The Church will less and less be able to speak to the world with effectiveness. Contrary to the old adage, in that case no news will not be Good News.

Dialogue, then, is the model that is recommended and exemplified by this book for doing theology, that is, reasoned reflection on one’s beliefs about God and the meaning of human life. It is a model that is distinctively different from a defensive, or even explanatory, model-the second is really just a less abrasive, kindlier form of the first. They both assume that the first party has the truth which either must be defended against the attacks of assumedly evil-willed others, or explained to ignorant others. The dialogue model assumes a commitment to truth on the part of all participants, but also a realization that no one partner has an exclusive or complete hold on that truth. In the words of the Vatican Secretariat for Unbelievers, the purpose of dialogue is to attain “a greater grasp of truth . . . to liberate those engaged in discussion from their solitude and their mutual distrust ... to reach an agreement, to be established in the realm of truth ... and the achievement by common effort of a better grasp of truth and an extension of knowledge.”¹

Various other elements of the central authority of the Roman Catholic Church have also in recent years publicly recognized the propriety of pursuing the truth by dialogue. For example, Pope Paul VI in 1964, in his very first encyclical, focused on dialogue, stating that, “dialogue is demanded nowadays.... It is demanded by the dynamic course of action which is changing the face of modem society. It is demanded by the pluralism of society and by the maturity man has reached in this day and age. Be he religious or not, his secular education has enabled him to think and speak and conduct a dialogue with dignity.”²

Ten years later the Vatican Committee for Religious Relations with the Jews wrote, “From now on real dialogue must be established.”³ Years earlier (in 1968), the Vatican Secretariat for Unbelievers forcefully expressed the idea that “all Christians should do their best to promote dialogue... as a duty of fraternal charity suited to our progressive and adult age.”⁴ This impressive document (is there a certain irony in the fact that-with its spirit of openness and generosity-it was issued by a Vatican agency for relations with unbelievers, and not from one for relations with Catholics, like the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith?) goes on to essentially link a commitment to dialogue with a commitment to Church renewal: “The willingness to engage in dialogue is the measure and the strength of that general renewal which must be carried out in the Church, which implies a still greater appreciation of liberty.”⁵ That being the case, such renewal-related dialogue should be pursued not only when the various views are moderately close together, but rather, “dialogue is of greater importance... when it takes place between people of different and even sometimes opposing opinions. They try to dispel each other’s prejudiced opinions and to increase, as much as they are able, consensus between themselves.”⁶

Thus dialogic “search for truth,” as all the Catholic bishops of the world taught at Vatican II, “must be carried out in a manner that is appropriate to the dignity of the human person and his social nature, namely by free inquiry with the help of teaching or instruction, communication and dialogue.”⁷ According to at least one Vatican curial agency this dialogic search for truth is by no means limited to “practical” matters, but in a central way is to focus on theology and doctrine, and to do so without hesitation or trepidation: “Doctrinal dialogue should be initiated with courage and sincerity, with the greatest of freedom and with reverence. It focuses on doctrinal questions which are of concern to the parties to dialogue. They have different opinions but by common effort they strive to improve mutual understanding, to clarify matters on which they agree, and if possible to enlarge the areas of agreement. In this way the parties to dialogue can enrich each other.”⁸

However, “If dialogue is to achieve its aims, it must obey the rules of truth and liberty. It needs sincere truth, thus excluding manipulated doctrinal discussion, discussion which is undertaken for political ends.... in discussion the truth will prevail by no other means than by the truth itself. Therefore the liberty of the participants must be ensured by law and reverence in practice.”⁹

To be sure, there is risk involved in dialogue-if one is really open to what the partner says one has to reckon with the possibility that s/he will prove to be persuasive on any particular issue: “Doctrinal discussion requires perceptiveness, both in honestly setting out one’s own opinion and in recognizing the truth everywhere, even if the truth demolishes one so that one is forced to reconsider one’s own position, in theory and in practice, at least in part.”¹⁰

We of course never will know for certain what the attitude of Albino Luciani would have been as Pope John I toward doing theology on the dialogue model, but we do know that he wrote a complimentary letter to Hans Küng on his 1974 book On Being a Christian,¹¹ which on the other hand was the object of a bitter, protracted attack by several German hierarchs ¹² and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on December 18, 1979.¹³

Even though there has been an extraordinary return to the pre-Vatican II defensive model by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1979,¹⁴ there still are public verbal commitments by Pope John Paul II to intellectual freedom of inquiry, which is the foundation of the dialogic model: “The Church needs her theologians, particularly in this time and age.... The Bishops of the Church... all need your [theologians’] work, your dedication and the fruits of your reflection. We desire to listen to you and we are eager to receive the valued assistance of your responsible scholarship.... We will never tire of insisting on the eminent role of the university... a place of scientific research which must apply the highest standards of scientific research, constantly updating its methods and working instruments... in freedom of Investigation.”¹⁵ He even went so far as to comment that, “Truth is the power of peace.... What should one say of the practice of combating or silencing those who do not share the same views?”¹⁶ However, that statement was released by the Vatican on December 18, 1979, three days after the Vatican mandatory interrogation of Schillebeeckx and the same day the Vatican, with Pope John Paul II’s explicit approval, censured Küng, “who did not share the same views” as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Is the dialogic model to be used by the Vatican only ad extra, while the defensive model is to be used ad intra?¹⁷ If Such is the aim of some in the Curia, they are deluding themselves. All credibility in the necessary honesty and sincerity of the Roman Catholic partner is automatically shattered by such a double standard. This can be seen by the immediate, uniformly negative outpouring of protests by an extraordinarily wide range of Protestant and Orthodox Christians, starting with the World Council of Churches in Geneva:

December 19, 1979

Geneva (EPS) A Spokesman for the World Council of Churches (WCC) made the following statement today on the dispute between the Roman Catholic Curia and Professor Hans Küng:

“The dispute is in essence concerned with the issue of authority in the Church which has become the most sensitive point in ecumenical theological discussion. The action taken against Professor Küng, therefore, cannot be regarded simply as an internal affair of the Roman Catholic Church but has immediate ecumenical repercussions.

“Already in 1973 when the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published a ‘Declaration in Defence of the Catholic Doctrine on the Church against Certain Errors of the Present Day’ (Mysterium ecclesiae), the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, Dr. Philip A. Potter, said, in his report to Central Committee: ‘I regret the publication of this Declaration which seems, in its basic intention, to limit the search for new ways of understanding and expressing the Church’s faith and life in the post-Vatican 2 climate and in a rapidly changing world. It will now be necessary to discover how far and in what manner we can together pursue theological discussions whether bilaterally or multilaterally.’

“The decision against Professor Küng highlights the urgent need for the WCC, and in all likelihood for the Churches which are in official dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church, to raise this fundamental issue with the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity of the Roman Curia.”

In any case, Küng, Schillebeeckx, and the other Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and non-Christian scholars do here proceed to do theology according to the dialogic model, which, as noted above, at least part of the Vatican Curia insisted “is the measure and strength of that general renewal which must be carried out in the Church, which implies a still greater appreciation of liberty. Doctrinal dialogue should be initiated with courage and sincerity, with the greatest freedom and with reverence,”¹⁸ remembering that 2500 bishops at Vatican II stated that, “all are led... wherever necessary, to undertake with vigor the task of renewal and reform,” that all Catholics’ “primary duty is to make a careful and honest appraisal of whatever needs to be renewed and done in the Catholic household itself,” in working for the “continual reformation of which the Church always has need.”¹⁹

TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS IN CATHOLIC

(AND ECUMENICAL) THEOLOGY

Hans Küng

In the recent past Catholic theology has experienced some stormy times. The Second Vatican Council turned out to be a more decisive theological turning-point than many observers initially assumed. The First Vatican Council brought on the virtually complete triumph of neo-scholastic theology. More precisely, it marked the victory of that brand of Vatican Denzinger theology that was almost entirely supported by the Church’s Magisterium which culminated in those addresses of Pius XII, produced by Roman professors, and issued from the Vatican practically on a daily basis. However, the Second Vatican Council demonstrated that this theology was unable to deal effectively with the contemporary problems of humanity, the Church, and society. Although it did not result in the disappearance of the theology that dominated the scene between the First and Second Vatican Councils, it nonetheless did spell the end of its absolute theological hegemony. As a result there emerged once again the ancient Catholic theological pluralism which had been repressed with every possible means during the interim period in question. However, a concomitant development was the undermining of that no doubt artificial, yet nonetheless actual, consensus in Catholic theology that previously existed. Moreover, at that time it was not clear how any kind of consensus could be established.

On the surface Vatican II appeared to grapple only with intra-church problems and very constricted areas of theological concern. It touched upon the relationship between Scripture and tradition (however still within a Tridentine frame of reference). The Council dealt primarily with ecclesiology and the related issues of ecumenism, Judaism, world religions and religious freedom. Finally, it concerned itself with the question of the “Church in the Modem World.” However, in the meantime, it was not generally noticed that all the other areas of theology were affected by the new orientation. What was only intimated in the debate about such topics as the Church, apostolic succession, the structure of offices and the celebration of the Eucharist became clearly evident to everyone in the debate over infallibility. That meant that the very foundations of the prevalent theology were under attack and apparently neither the defensive, positivist Vatican theology nor the newer patristic or speculative mediating theology could secure them. Was, in fact, a consensus in Catholic theology no longer possible?

It should be noted that those who have called attention to the problem were not its creators. Radical, fundamental questions had arisen since the Reformation and especially since the Enlightenment. However, the prevalent “Theologie der Vorzeit” (J. Kleutgen) did everything within its power to forestall them-at least until the next crisis. The numerous theological arguments prior to Vatican I and the “Syllabus of Errors” of Pius IX 1864, the Modernist crisis and the encyclical “Pascendi” of Pius X (1907), the “Nouvelle Theologie” and the encyclical “Humani generis” of Pius XII (1950) along with the attendant purges represented the widely visible outbreak of an underground rumbling that had now surfaced.

Thus, in Vatican II, despite all the difficulties, much was accomplished theologically. It took place in the area of inner-church reform, especially worship, and in the relationship to other churches, the Jews and the other religions of the world, and finally in the Church’s stance vis-à-vis contemporary society in general. However, a genuine reflection on theological foundations could not take place because of the domination of the Council by the curial apparatus, especially the theological commission under Cardinal Ottaviani. As a result there were no decisive contributions from the domains of critical exegesis or the history of dogma nor above all from Protestant and Orthodox theology. The foundation appeared once again to be given in defined or undefined traditional doctrinal elements. To be sure, even a not particularly sensitive observer could perceive a dangerous dampness on the arches and corrosion on the walls of the great traditional doctrinal edifice. However, instead of a radical restoration of the foundations, what one found was an attempt to cover over the elements under attack with new paint. Little wonder then that after the Council the critical defects were soon visible again and the corrosion threatened the stability of the entire edifice of traditional doctrine.

There was a double movement evident in the post-Conciliar theology. On one hand the movement was centripetal. Critical research proceeded from the secondary areas of research of ecclesiology and ecumenism to a quest for sure foundations necessary to the primary areas of Christology and the theology of God. Exegesis had effected preparatory work in this domain for decades with its quest for the historical Jesus. The demand to integrate the results of this work into a benumbed neo-scholastic dogmatics became ever more imperative. And since modern exegesis was generally neglected in otherwise productive movements of theological renewal, such as the patristics-oriented “ressourcement” (H. DeLubac, J. Danielou, H. U. Von Balthasar) as well as the speculative-transcendental mediation of Karl Rahner, their insufficiency became more and more apparent.

On the other hand the movement was centrifugal. “The Modem World,” introduced into the Church during the Council, desired not only abstract and general theological recognition but as serious a consideration as possible in all its multi-layeredness and ambivalence. Reading the “signs of the times” proved to be an endlessly more difficult and complex task than had been assumed in the Council. The societal upheavals of the late sixties gave rise directly to “political theology” and then in Latin America to a “Theology of Liberation.”

In our current decade it has become increasingly evident that the only theology (primarily systematic and especially dogmatic theology) that could survive the future would be one that was daringly able to blend two vital elements in a nontraditional and highly convincing manner. These two elements are a “return to the sources” and a “venturing forth on to uncharted waters,” or to put the matter less poetically, a theology of Christian origins and center enunciated within the horizon of the contemporary world.

Is all this self-evident? No, such a theology is essentially different from those which envision Church dogmas as the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of systematic theology. Such theologies reiterate in positivistic fashion dogmas that have become questionable while attempting to demonstrate their validity on the basis of Scripture and tradition, attempting to make them more palatable to contemporary humanity by the use of transcendental or other speculative methodologies. On the other hand, a theology which attempts to reflect out of the Christian origins and center within the horizon of the contemporary world will not view Church dogmas, despite all necessary critiques, as unnecessary or even impossible. Rather, these dogmas will retain their function, or better, they will recover their original function. Unlike the various forms of Denzinger theology, dogmas will not be equated with the Christian message: rather they will be viewed as originally formulated, as official aids, guides and warning signs in the course of the centuries that are intended to protect the Church, the individual, and of course theologians, from misunderstanding the Christian message.

A Possibly Useful Comparison

In both Edward Schillebeeckx’s books on Jesus, Jezus, het verhaal van een levende (1974) (Jesus, an Experiment in Christology, 1979), and Gerechtigheid en liefide: Genade en bevrijding (1977) (“Justice and Love: Grace and Liberation”), and in my recent books, Christ sein (1974) (On Being a Christian, 1976), and Existiert Gott? Antwort auf die Gottesfrage der Neuzeit (1978) (“Does God Exist?”), an attempt was made to develop a theology of origins for the benefit of the present. It would thus be appropriate in accordance with a desire expressed by many to attempt a comparison of these two theologies, not in a detailed fashion but only in their main features, primarily in the area of hermeneutics and methodology. This comparison will be effected on the basis of Schillebeeckx’s Tussentijds verhaal over twee Jezusboeken (1978) (“Interim Report Concerning Two Jesus Books”) in which he presents the interpretive principles which guide both his Jesus books.¹ Such a comparison is all the more interesting since we were both theologians at Vatican II and have been active in the direction of the international theological publication Concilium. Although our books were contemporaneous, they were written completely independently of one another.

Nevertheless, a comparison of these books is not an easy matter because their thematic structure is in no way identical. For example, in On Being a Christian there are only brief sections concerning grace and justification, whereas Schillebeeckx developed in the second volume a wide-ranging theology of grace from the New Testament.² In addition, Schillebeeckx handles the problem of God in the context of Christology, whereas I dealt with this theme in a separate volume in the light of modern philosophy and theology. Also, while Schillebeeckx provides a thorough treatment of hermeneutical-methodological issues, I have done so only where absolutely necessary. As a result Schillebeeckx envisions his two volumes as prolegomena to a future third volume that will actually treat of Christology. On the other hand, I hope to take up the question of Justification (1957) once again in the context of a treatise on “grace.”

Nonetheless, if seen in the context of interpretive principles, despite their differences, there appears to emerge from these books a fundamental hermeneutical agreement which is shared not only by most Catholic exegetes but also by an increasing number of younger Catholic systematicians more adequately trained in exegesis. Perhaps this development will form the basis for a new fundamental consensus in Catholic (and possibly not only Catholic) theology, despite legitimate methodological and factual differences. The fundamental hermeneutical agreement primarily concerns what Schillebeeckx terms the “two sources” upon which contemporary scientific theology can draw, namely, the “traditional experience of the great Judeo-Christian movement on the one hand, and on the other the contemporary human experiences of Christians and non-Christians” (p. 13).³

Without engaging in the kind of semantic debate so common in theology, I would rather speak of the “two poles” of theology. I do so in order to highlight more vividly the tension within, as it were, the elliptical movement of our theologizing, more than would be the case in using an image of two sources or streams flowing together. Let us attempt to work out on the basis of Schillebeeckx’s Interim Report a fundamental consensus that, despite the not to be overlooked distinctions, will possibly point the way for Catholic, and might I say for ecumenical, theology of the future. We will treat the first and second poles in separate sections and, in addition to pointing to fundamental agreements, we will also raise some critical questions.

The First “Source,” Theology Pole, and Standard of Christian Theology Is God’s Revelational Address in the History of Israel and the History of Jesus

The following points of agreement stand out:

1. Divine revelation and human experience are not simply antithetical, Rather, divine revelation is only accessible through human experience. Schillebeeckx affirms quite rightly that revelation to be sure “does not originate in subjective human experience and reflection” but “can only be perceived in and through human experiences” (p. 20). God speaks through humans. God’s revelation is not a human product or project, yet it embraces human projects, experiences, events and interpretations. Human experience is not the ground of God’s revelation, rather God’s revelation is the ground of the human faith response. However, revelation is not directly and immediately the Word of God but the human word engendered in an interpreted context from the experience of the Word of God.

In this sense there is no revelation outside of human experience. And without the specific experience of Jesus of Nazareth, who provides sense, a meaning, and a direction to human existence, there would be no Christianity. For the Christian faith, Jesus is the definitive revelation of God in the history of Israel because he was so experienced by his first disciples (subjectively) and he was such for them (objectively). The subjective and objective moments belong together. “The interpretive experience is an essential element in the concept of revelation” (p. 20f.). Certainly the faith of Jesus’ disciples does not constitute God’s revelation, salvation and grace. However, without their experience of faith they could proclaim nothing about Jesus as God’s revelation, salvation and grace. Thus revelation comes about “in a lengthy process of events, experiences and interpretations,” and “not as a supernatural ‘intrusion’ or, so to speak, a magical trick, although it is nonetheless not a human product” (p. 21). Thus we have the image of revelation coming “from above,” from God but continually experienced, interpreted, verified and then made the object of theological reflection “from below” by humanity. This leads us to our second point.

2. The human experience of revelation is not interpreted after the fact. Rather it is always given from the outset through the medium of human interpretation. Again, Schillebeeckx quite rightly affirms “the interpretive explication is an inner moment of the experience itself, at first unexpressed and known later upon reflection” (p. 22). No experience-of love, but also of revelation, salvation and grace-is ever “pure,” but only interpretively given, even if this is not a matter of reflection from the outset. Every experience is already accompanied by elements of interpretation. At the same time this experience is enriched by further interpretive elements and finally verbalized in specific conceptual or figurative statements of the interpretation (interpretament), which can affect the original experience by deepening or leveling it.

However, beyond all concepts and images there are general interpretive frameworks or theoretical models of understanding (paradigms) of which we are more or less conscious. It is from the perspective which they provide that we attempt to comprehend, order and synthesize our varying experiences. No experience, even in the instance of biblical or ecclesiastical expressions of faith, is without an interpretive framework, model of understanding or implicit theory. The influence of experience and theory is reciprocal.

Thus, not only the experiences from the history of Israel but also the experiences of Jesus were from the outset interpreted differently by the biblical authors. The basic common experience of salvation from God in Jesus was depicted in the Synoptics, in the Pauline and Johannine writings, in very distinct sets of questions and conceptual forms utilizing varying patterns of thought and speech. They wrote within the interpretive frameworks of their environment and the socio-cultural milieu of their age. These figurative and conceptual models and descriptions stem from a completely different world of experience that no longer speaks directly to us today, but which we must interpret anew.

At times the reality of Christian salvation was confused with certain time and culture-bound images, concepts and frames of reference taken from popular experience (for example, release from slavery, bloody cultic sacrifice, world ruler). This occurred to the detriment of the Christian faith itself. “We cannot truly make it incumbent upon Christians throughout the ages who have believed in the salvific worth of the life and death of Jesus simply to give credence to all these ‘interpretaments’ or explanations. Once meaningful and suggestive images and interpretations can become irrelevant in another culture” (p. 25).

In the New Testament different interpretaments were utilized with great freedom. “This also affords us the liberty to depict anew our experience of salvation with Jesus in key terms that are taken from our own contemporary culture with its own problems, needs and expectations. These latter, of course, must also undergo the scrutiny of the expectation of Israel as it was fulfilled in Jesus. Even more, this must be done if we are to remain faithful to the experience of salvation in Jesus which New Testament Christians encountered, preached, and therefore promised to us” (p. 25). This leads us to the third point.

3. The source, standard and criterion of Christian faith is the living Jesus of history. Through historical-critical research into the life of Jesus the Christian faith is historically responsible in the light of the contemporary consciousness of problems and is protected from faulty interpretations arising from within or outside the Church. Schillebeeckx is correct in affirming that, “It is not the historical image of Jesus but rather the living Jesus of history who stands at the beginning and is the source, standard and criterion of that which the first Christians interpretively encountered in him. It is precisely by considering the structure of primitive Christian belief that historical critical research can clarify for us the manner in which the actual content of this original Christian belief was fulfilled by the Jesus of history” (p. 44).

Further historical inquiry into the Jesus of history is not only possible on the basis of the New Testament sources but also necessary in the light of the advanced state of the contemporary consciousness of problems. Christianity is not founded on myths, legends or tales, nor solely on a doctrine (for it is not a religion of a book). Rather, it is based primarily on the historical personality of Jesus of Nazareth who was seen as the Christ of God. The New Testament witness-kerygmatic reports-does not enable us to reconstruct Jesus’ biographical or psychological development. Besides, this is not at all necessary. However, they do permit us to accomplish a task that is urgently required today for theological and pastoral reasons. Namely, today we can once again gain an insight into the original outlines of the message of Jesus as well as his personal lifestyle and destiny, which in the course of the centuries has been obscured and hidden. It should be possible for contemporary humanity to trace the “mental journey” (itinerarium mentis) of the first disciples from the baptism to the death of Jesus in order to comprehend why, after his death, he was proclaimed as the living Christ and Son of God. Only from the standpoint of his preaching and lifestyle does the execution of Jesus become comprehensible. It is only from this perspective that the cross and resurrection are not formalized into abstract events of salvation.

No contradiction can be permitted between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. We must be able to identify the Christ of faith as the Jesus of history. Naturally historical-critical research into the life of Jesus neither desires nor has the capacity to prove that the man Jesus of Nazareth is in reality the Christ of God. The recognition of Jesus as the Christ always remains a venture of faith and trust or a metanoia. However, historical-critical research can aid us in assuring that the Christ in whom we believe is really the man Jesus of Nazareth and not some other person or perhaps no one at all. Our belief in the true Christ can all too easily be distorted into a superstitious attachment to an imaginary Christ or to a mere sign or symbol. A theology that is aware of its responsibilities must take seriously the doubt experienced by so many of our contemporaries concerning the traditional image of Christ. It should defend the Christian faith not only against the assaults of non-belief but also against ecclesiastical shortcircuits or distorted descriptions. The projections of belief as wen as unbelief must undergo scrutiny from the perspective of the genuine historical reality of Jesus. Therefore, “fides quaerens intellectum historicum”-faith seeking historical understanding-must be combined with “intellectus historicus quaerens fidem”-a historical understanding seeking faith. Thus a faith-interpretation of Jesus, if it is truly to serve the interests of faith, must likewise be a historically plausible interpretation.

Only a theology which seriously considers and, as far as possible, attempts to solve those problems enunciated by history can be seen as functioning at the contemporary level of critical awareness current among those (in the West and the East) who have undergone a Western education. Only such scientific theology stands on a par with the scholarly spirit of our time. Thus it is an unavoidably arduous task to employ the historical-critical method in a comprehensive sense in order to find out what we can establish about the Jesus of history with scientific certainty or great probability. The result of this endeavor is not to abrogate the biblical canon or church tradition, for indeed the history of dogma finds its roots at the very beginning of the Christian movement, even in the New Testament.

First Area of Agreement

I am in full agreement with the hermeneutical principles of Edward Schillebeeckx that have been briefly outlined here. In fact, I presented these same principles in yet a different form in On Being a Christian and Existiert Gott? On the other hand Schillebeeckx might well be in agreement with the hermeneutical conclusions I contemporaneously yet independently worked out in the Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift (1979/Nr. 1) in response to an essay by the exegete Josef Blank, “Exegese als theologische Basiswissenschaft.” In that context I outlined some of the elements of the hermeneutical position that has appeared in my work from the programatic hermeneutical discussions with Ernst Käsemann and Hermann Diem (1962), to the initial realization of this program and the turn to the historical Jesus in The Church (1967), and continuing up until my latest publications.

Amazingly, Edward Schillebeeckx, originally an exponent of Thomism, has, in the search for sure foundations, traveled along the same path as I. It is a path pointed out by the New Testament itself as one on which alone the authority of Scripture is discovered, its inner unity realized. It is a path that provides a new access to the historical Jesus through the medium of historical-critical methodology. It was this Jesus who was experienced and proclaimed as Lord and Christ by the disciples.

Thus Schillebeeckx is attempting to realize a program similar to the one I formulated, which might serve as a foundation for a future consensus in Catholic theology. Exegesis that is grounded in the historical-critical method calls for a dogmatics that is likewise historically-critically grounded. This implies that the results of critical exegesis should not be hindered or ignored by dogmatic theology (neo-scholastic conservatism) nor circumvented, toyed with or domesticated (historical or speculative harmonization). Rather they must be taken up and systematically assimilated (historical-critical responsibility).

According to Vatican II Scripture should be the “soul” and “Principle of Life” of Catholic theology. The same Council also fundamentally affirmed the historical-critical method. Are we mistaken if we see signs among other Catholic theologians that there is a movement in the direction of historical-critical responsibility? Can a serious systematic theology that seeks to deal responsibly with Christian origins ground itself in anything other than the biblical findings attained through historical-critical exegesis, even if this requires a bit more effort on the part of the systematician? If an unhistorical exegesis is definitely out of date in this era, so also is an unhistorical dogmatic theology. If the Bible must undergo critical interpretation, it is all the more imperative that post-biblical dogmas be subject to the same scrutiny. A theology which fails to critically investigate the “data” and remains overtly or covertly authoritarian will in the future, despite protestations to the contrary, lose any viable claim to scientific respectability.

Question I

Edward Schillebeeckx depicts the Catholic as well as Protestant response to his two books about Jesus as “basically positive” (p. 10). He notes a fundamental agreement in all his detailed critical work above by exegetes (including German exegetes) and a fair critique by systematic theologians such as M. Löhrer and P. Schoonenberg. However, there were countless misunderstandings among individual German dogmatic theologians. Some theologians appear to read quite badly. Schillebeeckx often “rubbed his eyes” (v. p. 94) in disbelief when he realized how he was being misunderstood. He rejects interpretations and insinuations such as the label of “liberalism” on the part of W. Kasper, W. User and L. Scheffczyk as “unfounded,” “false,” “incomprehensible,” yes even “science fiction.” Perhaps this reaction is due to the shock of the Reformation, but why in the land of Luther do Catholic dogmatic theologians feel called upon again in this discussion to stand forth as the defenders of orthodoxy without a genuine understanding of the issues involved? To the “dismay” of those systematic theologians who “don’t know what to make of the critical results of modem exegesis” (p. 10) Schillebeeckx states, “one cannot so completely affirm one’s own perspective as the only legitimate theological possibility, for in so doing we will lose the capacity for a genuine understanding of other possibilities. There is no need for theologians to contribute further to the ever growing polarization by implying that one theology is more concerned than another in maintaining the purity of the Christian faith. Apparently we find here a more common ‘plurality of anxieties”’ (p. 114).

One would have to grant to Schillebeeckx that in the midst of the thoroughly justified concern about “orthodoxy,” “the other concern, i.e., to transmit the unabbreviated Good News in an understandable fashion” is also justified, and “at certain times can be the more pressing of the two” (p. 10). Naturally that does not mean, according to Schillebeeckx, that we do not find in this case serious and legitimate questions needing to be discussed. It appears to me we need a methodological and substantive clarification if the fundamental consensus we desire is ever to be achieved. Only in this way can we be assured that secondary differences do not conceal or call into question a more primary consensus. This will be clarified briefly by an example which appears in the serious and systematic criticism of Schillebeeckx’s larger work, as in his Interim Report (pp. 46-57). It touches on the systematic handling of the exegetical problem of Q.⁴ To be sure Schillebeeckx has not, as some German critics contend, exhibited a tendentious “predilection” in favor of the source of sayings common to Matthew and Luke (equals Q). However, this hypothesis plays an important role in his historical reconstruction of the primordial level of the Christian kerygma. Since this collection of the Lord’s sayings make no mention of the death and resurrection of Jesus, Schillebeeckx concludes that the first Christology-under the strong influence of the spirit of Judaism-must not have been an Easter Christology (of the crucified and risen Jesus) but a Parousia Christology (of the departed Jesus who was soon to return).

We really should not immediately raise such a historical question to the level of an issue of faith, as is done by the aforementioned dogmaticians. The solution to historical questions should not be prejudiced on the basis of dogmatic fears, as if what may not be, cannot be. “What really happened?” This question must be answered in an unprejudiced fashion qua historical question. We may assume with historical certainty the existence of a source of sayings that was lost ‘very early. We can also assume with reasonable certainty that there existed at least within a certain context in the period prior to and during the composition of the New Testament a number of distinct Christologies. However, can we, on the basis of the Q hypothesis, proceed to postulate not only the existence of a compiler of the Q material but also a Q-community, even one which continued to exist until later? Does this not represent the construction of further, unverified hypotheses on the foundation of another hypothesis? Do not these additional hypotheses become all the more tenuous the higher we pile them? Does not this procedure misconstrue the literary character of the Q-material which essentially presents a collection of sayings of the historical Jesus whose historical credibility is enhanced by the absence of a soteriology of the cross and a Christology centered on the resurrection?

Regardless of how one handles the question of Q, I only mention this example in order to raise the methodological issue of the relationship of exegesis and dogmatics. Is it theologically correct and pastorally helpful (an area of great concern to Schillebeeckx) for systematic theologians to make a case on the basis of hypotheses that are either scarcely verified or represented by only isolated exegetes? We have in mind the kind of overdrawn hypotheses continually being formulated in the research into the historical Jesus and then sooner or later rectified. A systematician ought to avoid getting entangled in the thicket of exegetical hypotheses as if to serve as an arbiter among individual exegetes. He or she is not competent for that. His or her systematic presentation can all too easily divert into extraneous areas and end up as a purely hypothetical affair.

Well, then, how should we react to this myriad of exegetical opinions? Schillebeeckx correctly asserts that we need not as systematicians in every case await the general consensus among exegetes. In many instances such a consensus simply fails to appear. Then, often an individual exegete might prove to be a pathfinder by maintaining a correct insight against a band of colleagues who mutually support one another. Nonetheless, it appears to me that normally-when an issue does not need to be systematically and definitively decided-it is wiser methodologically for a systematic theologian to rely as much as possible on secure exegetical conclusions that are supported by the broad consensus of critical research. For example, the consensus in the research into the life of Jesus is quite extensive. Wherever possible, however, the systematician should leave open those exegetical questions that remain unclarified. I have done something like this in On Being a Christian in reference to the debate concerning the title “Son of Man.” Schillebeeckx is in accord with this view in the matter of the Q-communities. Such an issue is “to a certain degree” meaningless for a systematic theology. “In terms of content this issue actually has very little significance” (p. 56).

And so what was said about the fundamental hermeneutical consensus is still valid. In fact, the degree of openness, expertise and intensity that Schillebeeckx, the systematic theologian, displays in his two major volumes in handling the biblical findings of critical research is truly amazing. At the same time, it is also amazing that he has provided us with a sensitive translation of ancient concepts into an idiom that is appealing to our age. Thus we have arrived at the second pillar of a possible hermeneutical consensus in Catholic theology.

The Second Source, Pole, and Horizon of Christian Theology

Is Our Own Human World of Experience

We can note the following points of agreement:

1. At issue here are our daily, common, human experiences in all their ambiguity. It is not a question, as in prior theology, of the elite experiences of intellectual clerics. Nor are we concerned with novel yet nonetheless time-conditioned academic systems and methods. Rather, Schillebeeckx emphasizes that “under consideration here are our daily experiences, the feel for life we find in the world among human beings, our deepest problems of meaning, life, and society” (p. 14). In essence we must explore the common human experience of Christians and non-Christians. We must recognize that the humanities and the social and natural sciences also have important contributions to make in this context.

These experiences today are rarely or never unambiguously religious but rather are essentially ambivalent. In the secular world, in the contemporary crisis of faith, we can perceive a gap between tradition and experience (more precisely between the traditional Christian experience and the individual and collective experiences of today). However, this situation does not require that theology and the Church revert to a private spiritual subjectivity, or take refuge in purely political concerns, or nostalgically long for the Christian society of the past. The religious dimension of human existence, which is not to be equated with specific institutions or dogmas, is still a source of fascination for humanity. Indeed, humanity experiences anew its alienation in the secular, scientific, technological world.

2. These human experiences stand in need of meaningful religious Christian interpretation. These vague non-directed ambiguous experiences that often push humanity to a limit (an ultimate senselessness or a transcendent meaning?) must be referred to a meaningful interpretation. This is possible for humanity only through the medium of a new comprehensive religious experience which integrates all previous experiences. However, by what means can we arrive at such a religious experience? Contemporary secular humanity rarely receives religious experiences directly from on high in the form of a passively endured experience. Instead, in the midst of immediacy and spontaneity, it experiences them more than earlier by means of reflection. As Schillebeeckx correctly mentions, “modern humanity ponders certain experiences and interprets them often in a cautious and groping fashion as religious. The ambiguous experiences that it undergoes are both positive (providing an experience of infinity) as well as negative (providing an experience of finitude). They confront contemporary humanity with a basic decision, i.e., they are a challenge to an honest confrontation with its own experience” (p. 15).

Such a religious confrontation with our experiences does not de facto occur in the abstract, in an isolated fashion. Rather, we find it in a specific culture or religious tradition, whether it be Christian or perhaps Buddhist. However, when does this religious encounter with the ambivalence of human experiences become an experience of Christian faith? “Whenever someone, in the light of what s/he has heard about Christianity, in the midst of this confrontation with human experiences, concludes ‘Yes, that’s it, that’s it.’ That which the churches proclaim in their message as an option in life can be experienced by others, and what for them can provisionally only be called a ‘project of seeking’ (H. Kuitert) will within this confrontation with experience (within the project of seeking) ultimately become a completely personal act of Christian faith-a personal faith conviction with a concrete Christian belief content” (pp. 16-17).

3. Theology has to establish a critical correlation between traditional Christian experience and contemporary experience. These days people accept the Christian credo less and less on the basis of the mere authority of another. Rather, it is accepted only in and through the confrontation with experience which is interpreted in the light of Christian history of experience as it is transmitted by the Church. According to Schillebeeckx that means “catechesis and preaching must not only illuminate contemporary human experience but must also unfold as responsibly, precisely and suggestively as possible what the Christian view of existence can concretely mean for humanity in our time” (p. 17).

In this process we cannot simply “utilize” an already well-known, purportedly timeless, eternal message. Instead, it calls for a new “translation” of this message in terms of our own world of experience. We have already heard the assertion that the contemporary situation is an inner, constitutive element in our understanding of God’s revelation. Indeed, we can only employ the word “God” in a meaningful sense when it is experienced as a liberating response to the genuine problems of fife. Our preaching cannot be carried on as a “take it or leave it” proposition. An alien conceptual system does not aid us in proclaiming the Gospel to modern humanity. And certainly we do not seek a type of catechesis that is exclusively experience-oriented without reference to the story of Jesus.

It already became clear as we reflected on the first pole of Christian theology that we cannot simply take over prior interpretations of the salvific significance of Jesus. Neither may we simply relegate the Jesus of history, his message, fife-style and destiny to being an arbitrary symbol for our own human experiences. No, a theology that truly wishes to serve the Christian proclamation will not merely strive to find an arbitrary connection, but rather seek a “critical correlation” between past and present, between traditional Christian experience and our contemporary experience. According to Schillebeeckx such a critical correlation demands three things: “1) An analysis of our contemporary world of experience, 2) an investigation of the constant structures of the basic Christian experience spoken of by the New Testament and subsequent Christian tradition and 3) a critical relating of these two ‘sources.’ This is necessary for these biblical elements must structure our contemporary experience as they structured in a Christian fashion the actual environment of the various biblical authors. Only then can there be continuity in the Christian tradition. This continuity., however, also demands a sensitivity to any change in the horizon of questioning” (p. 63).

Second Area of Agreement

I am also in complete agreement with the foregoing hermeneutical principles of Edward Schillebeeckx. And I am probably not wrong in assuming that Schillebeeckx for his part could agree with the following ten guiding principles for contemporary theology that I formulated on the occasion of the publication of Existiert Gott?:

Theology should not be an esoteric science only for believers but should be intelligible to non-believers as well.

Theology should not exalt simple faith nor defend an “ecclesiastical” system but strive for the truth without compromise in intense scholarly fashion.

Ideological opponents should not be ignored or hereticized, nor theologically co-opted. Rather their views should be set out in a fair and factual discussion and interpreted in optimam partem as tolerantly as possible.

We should not only promote but actually practice an interdisciplinary approach. Along with a concentration upon our own field, we must maintain a constant dialogue with related fields.

We need neither hostile confrontation nor easy co-existence, but rather a critical dialogue especially between theology and philosophy, theology and natural science: religion and rationality belong together!

Problems of the past should not have priority over the wide-ranging, multifaceted dilemmas of contemporary humanity and society.

The criterion determining all other criteria of Christian theology can never again be some ecclesiastical or theological tradition or institution, but only the Gospel, the original Christian message itself. Thus, theology must everywhere be oriented toward the biblical findings analyzed by historical-critical analysis.

The Gospel should not be proclaimed in biblical archaisms nor in Hellenistic scholastic dogmatisms nor in fashionable philosophic-theological jargon. Rather, it should be expressed in the commonly understood language of contemporary humanity and we should not shy away from any effort in this direction.

Credible theory and livable practice, dogmatics and ethics, personal piety and reform of institutions must not be separated but seen in their inseparable connection.

10.

We must avoid a confessionalistic ghetto mentality. Instead we should espouse an ecumenical vision that takes into consideration the world religions as well as contemporary ideologies: as much tolerance as possible toward those things outside the Church, toward the religious in general, and the human in general, and the development of that which is specificall